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Heidegger, Levinas, and Derrida 
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Committee on Social Theory, 
University of Kentucky, 
Lexington, KY 
Much contemporary ethical and political clis-
course involves notions of the self, its community, 
and the "other" individuals and communities from 
whom it distinguishes itself and its own. 'I'he no-
tions of civility and incivility often play a crucial 
role here, since one prevalent human approach to 
difference has aimed either to include others ethi-
cally through their assimilation into a community 
or "civilization" of sameness, or to exclude others 
by designating them as beastly, savage, or "uncivi-
lized." This dynamic has operated in abundant 
well-documented inter-human relationships. This 
paper argues that the same dynamic structures 
much Western human-non-human animal theoreti-
cal discourse, and that much of what has been said 
about inter-human collective political activity and 
its ethical implications can and should be applied 
to questions regarding the ethical relationships be-
tween the community of human beings and its 
non-human animal others, especially in light of cer-
tain postmodern conditions. Indeed, in some ways, 
much contemporary political and ethical theory 
that explicitly addresses only inter-human relation-
ships is even more applicatory to the encounter be-
tween humans and non-human animals than it is to 
the relationship regarding which it was originally 
conceived. 
Paradox pervades the relationship between ci-
vility and animality. Often, purportedly civilized 
human beings contrast themselves from "beastly" 
or "savage" non-human animals, then justify treat-
ing these "uncivilized" animals with barbaric bru-
tality on grounds that only the civilized deserve to 
be treated with civility. .. uch thinking obviously 
violates the spirit of the moral demands implied in 
the connotations of "civility" that involve humane-
ness, gentleness, and kindness. 1 l will attempt to un-
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dermine this dynamic by building upon the current discourse on human collective 
political activity, human-non-human animal social relations, and thoughts of 
"postmodern" or "post-structuralist" thinkers Martin I Ieidcggcr, Emmanuel 
Levinas, and Jacques Derrida. 
Before launching into a discussion of the interspecies relationship, it may be 
helpful to examine relevant concepts as they appear in current discourse on inter-
human political encounters, for a recent trend here reconceptualizcs the relation-
ship between the community and its others in ways eminently applicable to the 
interspecies encounter. The two thinkers examined in this section describe a di-
chotomizing move in traditional political discourse that they consider problematic 
and for which they seek an alternative middle ground. Though the authors' two 
projects do not precisely mirror each other, this paper indicates that the same gen-
eral structure that they see at work in the inter-human political realm also func-
tions in the human-non-human animal encounter. After examining the 
middle-ground position these authors advocate and incorporating ideas from 
Heidegger, Lcvinas, and Derrida, this study will endorse a similar middle-ground 
conclusion about the relationship between the human community and other ani-
mals. 
Civility, Ethics, and Animality in Contemporary Political Discourse 
Regarding human collective political activity, Martin I.!.. Marty portrays a de-
structive dichotomy between "totalism" and "tribalism" that he secs operating in 
the political milieu of the United States. As Marty describes the situation, the 
totalists, usually linked with nationalists, strive to suppress difference by enforcing 
a single ideology on each individual in the community. Totalists acknowledge the 
existence of dissenters from the communitarian creed, but they seek to nullify the 
difference that these marginalized voices embody by assimilating them within the 
pre-existing communal narrative. On the other hand, Marty describes triba)jsm as 
the view that the community at large cannot provide a coherent ideology-that 
only the smaller, particularized social groups to which one belongs can accomplish 
this (10-14). Marty secs a type of tribalist orientation operating in, among others, 
the work of Alasdair Mcintyre, who proclaims the existence of "incommensu-
rable universes of discourse," in which the subjective contexts within which any 
individual or group is inscribed preclude meaningful contact or mutual under-
standing (71-2). Regarding such an orientation (and demonstrating a humanistic 
limitation that this paper aims to address) Marty quotes Reinhold Niehbur's state-
ment, "lTJhe chief source of man's [sic] inhumanity to man seems to be the tribal 
limits of his sense of obligation to the other man" (12). 
According to Marty, the totalist and tribalist tendencies have wrought trauma 
in American life, and he avoids what he secs as an unnecessary dichotomy be-
tween assimilation and incommensurability with the concept of "symbiosis," 
which indicates for Marty "social life" or " living together." The idea is that while 
particular contextualized group differences can and should exist, the possibility 
also exists for the mutual enrichment of each group through their contact (147-
149). To resolve the tensions between those who seek to preserve or extend 
sameness and those who would protect their own group-based identity from con-
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tac~ ~ith ~the:ncss, Marty emphasizes the importance of the concept of story in 
political life. 1 he working "symbiotc" he envisions can be achievcd--and incom-
mcnsurability transcended--only when marginalized groups are able to assemble 
an? give voic~ to their plight and when the dominant group truly listens to this 
voice. I Tc wntes that Native Americans, Jews, and descendants of slaves must 
~peak up and tell their own story in order to, among other things, preserve their 
important cultural uniqueness (146). 
Iris Young likewise secs a debilitating dichotomy framing much of traditional 
political theory. The dichotomy Marty describes between tribalism and totalism 
~irrors. the ~ontrast Young tlescribcs in traditional political theory between indi-
vidual libernlism anti communitarianism. For Young, individual liberalism fails to 
a.ccommotlate the political significance of diffcrentfatetl cultural group identifica-
tion, anti thus burkes an important form of group sameness, while 
c~mmunitarian.ism suppresses difference, by imposing one view on the many (j11s-
lm 226-236). Like Marty, Young intends to chart a course that avoids the dilemma 
she dc~cribcs, encouraging the emphasis on group differences and refusing the as-
sum~tio~ that a theorist might obtain a comprehensive and detemporalizcd point 
of view independent of the social context in which issues of justice arise (j11slice 3-
4). Like Marty, who declares the totalist efforts to achieve a practically homog-
enous state to be dangerous if unchecked (11 -12), Young argues that we must not 
be deluded by a notion of an ideal homogenous community of shared subjectiv-
ity, for such an ideal assumes a problematic logic of identity, squelching differ-
ence, and she declares that political relations must affirm the group differences 
that they currently seek to exclude or assimilate (j11slice 232-236). 
. Notwithstanding work attempting to teach apes to use human-derived sym-
bolic languages (these will be discussed below), non-human animals are 
ontologically unable to tell us their story in a way that any marginalized human 
group could. Thus the ethical imperative of extending to them considerations of 
~'civility" as "kindness" and "humaneness" goes unrecognized by so many. This 
includes Marty, whose discussion is limi ted to the extension of civility without as-
similation only to affiliations based on uniquely human identity descriptors, e.g., 
race, sex, class, ethnicity, nationality, and language (20). Non-human animals as a 
marginalized group arc conspicuously absent from the list of those whose stories 
he wishes to include in the general discourse. The same is true of Young's analysis, 
whose valuable attention to approaching the question by listening to the op-
pressed (j11Slice 3-14 and I11c/11sio11 ch. 5), unfortunately, is limited to consideration 
of oppression with inter-human origins, e.g., "racism, sexism, homophobia, age-
ism, and ableism" (j11slice 11). The humanistic limitation in Young's work is further 
evidenced in her exaltation of city li fe as the ideal (and inevitable) mode of hu-
man existence (j11stice 237). Cities arc generally thought of as places where large 
numbers of people live, not as homes for non-human animals.2 One might regard 
Young's ideali%ation here as an example of the pathological positivism-the ac-
cepting as given of that which requires supplementation-that she elsewhere de-
cries (j11slice 3). Young's ideal of the city as the place where (human) strangers arc 
brought together can be fruitfully supplemented with the valorizations of wilder-
ness exhibited by thinkers such as Max Oelschlaeger, Akira Lippit, William 
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Cronon, and Ted Benton. In the city, admittedly different, contextualized groups 
do come together as strangers, but they do so in light of at least the possibility of 
some linguistic connection that is structurally impossible with other species, who 
remain in this sense ever stranger to us than any linguistically capable human. 
Some of these authors' ideas, however, arc more useful for understanding 
interspecies relations than is Young's rosy vision of the city. For example, Marty's 
discussion of story, when recontextualized, seems eminently apposite to the hu-
man-non-human animal encounter. Ile endorses an openness that preserves dif-
ference rather than assimilating or excluding it; this openness must acknowledge 
that another being's story may be uttered in an unfamiliar language-or may be 
undetectable at all. Such a perspective may be required in the encounter between 
different humans, most of whom have the communicative power of speech and 
writing-it is even more crucial for an appropriate understanding of the relation-
ship between humans and other animals, whose different subjectivity entails dif-
ferent modes of communication. 
Young's political analysis echoes themes from Marty's discourse on stories, es-
pecially those issuing from marginalized groups, when she heralds the importance 
of the "self-organization of marginalized people into affinity groupings lthatl en-
able people to develop a language in which to voice experiences" (I11c/11.rio11 155). 
This is exactly the type of complex self-organization and linguistic development 
and expression that are impossible for other species; thus it is inappropriate to ap-
ply the linguistic standard to questions regarding the ethical status of non-human 
animals. Among humans, some admittedly unstable but still significant political 
and ethical discourse is possible, because humans can give linguistic expression to 
their subjectivity and arc able to comprehend similar expressions by other hu-
mans. Between human and other animal species, on the other hand, this link is ab-
sent, and this relationship requires an ethics grounded in a notion of civility as the 
gentle treatment of a partially inaccessible other. For this reason, Young's formu-
lation of "a relationship of strangers who do not understand one another," when 
recontextualizcd along the same lines as indicated above regarding Marty's discus-
sion of story, facilitates the deployment of a more fitting ethical model for the 
interspecies relationship (jrfstice 234). If a non-human animal's story is to be told 
or heard, this will require both a different type of listening than that to which hu-
mans are accustomed, as well as an attempt (the success of which is assumed from 
the start to be circumscribed) to tell the story of non-humans' ethical importance 
in our own language. 
Marty and Young both inquire about the general question of the civil relation-
ship between the community and its others. Both authors seek a middle course 
that affirms group difference and that promotes contact without assimilation and 
meaningful exchange without complete subjective harmony, in contrast to tradi-
tional ethical theory, which has assumed that what is essential is to break down the 
barrier between beings for direct ethical exchange to occur- that the other must 
prove to be somehow like me. But both depend on some level of commensurabil-
ity in language, which is structurally impossible within the human-non-human ani-
mal relationship, so I now turn to recent work, performed across a range of 
disciplines, which explicitly investigates the nature of this encounter. 
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Humanity and Animality in Other Disciplines 
Within the current interdisciplinary discourse on the human-non-human ani-
mal relationship, a dichotomy of approaches seems to have emerged. One ap-
proach exclusively emphasizes (at least some species oQ non-human animals' 
sameness, in some important regard, vis-a-vis humanity; the other focuses exclu-
sively on non-human animals' otherness or difference from humanity in one or 
more crucial respects. The central questions in the two main works this paper will 
contrast to illustrate this dichotomy arc those that ground the rest of this paper-
questions about human and non-human animal ontology and about the ethical re-
lationship between the civilized human community and the beastly animal others. 
The Great Ape Project, edited by Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer, typifies the 
first half of the dichotomy. Fundamental to this project is the assumption that for 
any other person or animal to demand direct ethical consideration, some aspect of 
similnrity among the individuals involved is required, and its proponents go to 
great lengths to highlight ways in which animals arc similar to humans-geneti-
cally, physiologically, psychologically, emotionally, and socially. incc, the thesis 
claims, our "fellow great apes" (chimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutans) exhibit 
such similnrities, they should be included in the sphere of moral equality. As a rep-
resentative of the approach that overemphasizes sameness while neglecting the 
fruitful possibilities that difference can generate, the "Declaration on Great Apes" 
explicitly inculpates "ltlhe notion of 'us' as opposed to 'the other,' in the enabling 
of centuries of tribalism, nationalism, racism, and 'spccicsism"' (5). 
The second half of the work explores successes in communicating with apes 
via various means of symbolic systems derived by humans, in which animals do 
seem to exhibit similarity with human beings in their admittedly limited but mean-
ingful attachment of such symbols to physical objects, feelings, and people. 
Dawkins presents an arresting image of a computer-generated hypothetical "in-
termediate" human/chimpanzee face, evoking the theme of the continuity of 
species boundaries that runs throughout the book (86). Corbcy's contribution, 
"The Philosopher's Ape," argues for the existence of relative and gradual differ-
ences between humans and other great apes as opposed to purported essential 
and absolute differences highlighted "among philosophers" (133). In the appro-
priately titled contribution, "Who's Like Us?" r Iayrc and I Tayrc propose the exten-
sion of the "community of equals"- a concept already criticized by Marty and 
Young for its failure to note significant differences between members of the hu-
man community-and which this paper examines through a different philosophi-
cal lens than the one Corbey challenges (175). 
In a work as vast as this collection, there arc exceptions to the near-exclusive 
emphasis on sameness. For example, Mitchell (244) and Francione (256) admit the 
existence of the ontological difference between humans and other animals, to 
avoid the absurdity (often employed as a critique of "animal rights" positions) of 
requiring human interference with wildlife by policing the animal world to prevent 
violence. Particularly germane to this paper is Corbey's contribution, which por-
trays civility as the restraint of "animal" impulses and observes, " fAlnimals by 
their very nature act in uncivilized ways" (128). Tlcre Corbey touches upon the 
major point that must be faced by anyone who wants to extend to non-human ani-
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mals the kind of direct ethical consideration that is normally reserved for humans 
alone: this entails an asymmetrical and non-reciprocity based ethical structure, the 
deployment of which is facilitated by incorporating ideas from the writings of 
Heidegger, Levinas, and Derrida, as I will elaborate below. 
Jamieson also stumbles into this realm of transition from traditional philo-
sophical conceptualizations of animal being and its relationship to human being 
to the transformed conceptualization that I advocate when he writes, "Perhaps 
some day we will reach a stage in which the similarities among the grc..-at apes will 
be salient for us, and the differences among them will be dismissed as trivial and 
unimportant, or perhaps evt11 e11richi11g [emphasis mine!" (225). The goal that domi-
nates The Great Ape Project is summarized by the first two possibilities- that hu-
mans will recognize ethically significant similarities and that the differences 
between human and other ape species will be dismissed as trivial. I would like to 
emphasize the third possibility-that these differences may be psychologically, so-
ciologically, philosophically, and ethically enriching-and to argue that both tradi-
tional "modern" and much "postmodern" philosophical discourse has failed 
adequately to view through such a lens the region where the concepts of civility 
and animality intersect. 
In contrast with the sameness oriented Great Ape Project, Paul Shepard's en-
gaging and lyrical The Others: How A11imol.s Mode Us I ill1no11 emphasizes (or over-
emphasizes) the difference between human and non-human animal species, and 
thus his work serves as an effective foil to the predominant tack that exclusively 
accentuate sameness and community. For Shepard, the primary relationship be-
tween human beings and the non-human animal Other is established through hu-
man predation; indeed, for Shepard, omnivory is essential to what it means to be 
human; he declares that the human mind is "child of the hunt"-that the hunt 
"made us human" (17, 9). Ile couples this evolutionary story with a spiritual one 
in which humans' killing and eating of non-human animals effects a simulta-
neously physical and metaphysical transformation, which Shepard describes as 
"the ultimate act of respect," for it is "consummation as an act of unity with the 
Other [which] was the inspired legacy of omnivory" (12, 27). If c explicitly rejects 
the importance of civility as kindness when, describing his encounter with the 
"great naturalists;' he states that it was 11ot their "civilized kindness" that he valued 
but their "curiosity, receptive courtesy, gratitude and respect for the power of ani-
mals" (5). Shepard avoids anthropocentrism by speculating that for the non-hu-
man animal, death in the hunt may be painless or euphoric (29), and that for 
humans the killing and consumption of the non-human animal, infused by the 
power of our thankfulness (35), bestows upon us the radical and sacred gift of the 
animal of itself as meat (333). '1'his paper advocates reversing the structure-of-
fering non-human animals the radical gift (sec the discussion of Derrida below) 
of direct ethical consideration, which assumes no symmetry or reciprocity. 
Like thinkers such as Peter Singer, Shepard exhibits revulsion for factory 
farms, but, unlike Singer, he grounds this sentiment in an explicitly personal and 
spiritual communion with the other animals one rightfully consumes. Further-
more, Shepard consistently valorizes the flipside of this personal rclationship-
the "gut-wrenching' possibility of being eaten-though it is difficult to envision 
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t~is as the same type of possibility for (post)modern humanity as it was for our 
distant ancestors, whose existence Shepard desires to emulate. With the techno-
logical capacity to feed humans on a meat-free diet, it is far from clear that human 
predation upon other animals is either necessary or desirable. Shepard's work is 
inspiring for its insight into the mystery of non-human animal being and the fasci-
~,a~on it evokes'. but it is t~o fascinated with the institution of omnivory itsel£ 
I his can be partially remedied by an ethics of civility as kindness and as contact 
without assimilation. 
Where the project of this paper is concerned, Shepard's exaltation of 
omnivory is guilty of what Young termed bad " positivism," which assumes as 
given what should be critiqued- here the assimilatory structure of the human-
non-human animal relationship: of omnivory. Shepard over-emphasizes non-hu-
man animals' otherness and substitutes a particular humanistic vision of human 
versus animal ontology, without acknowledging the other types of meaningful 
connections that arc possible between human and non-human animal species, be-
yond that of predator and prey, which he so eloquently describes. Shepard views 
the animal world as a text to be read, approaching Marty>s and Young's emphasis 
on story, but encloses his analysis in one omnivorous rendering of the text, rarely 
considering possible non-human animal productions or "readings" of their own 
"texts." Regarding Shepard's analysis of the human story about non-human ani-
mality, though he attempts to subvert the oft-cited Western tendency to disguise 
the animal's living form behind its presentation as food, via semantic shifts-e.g., 
from " flc..,h" t " · t'' f " d If" " l" h' h · ..., o mca or rom torture ca to vca - 1s emp as1s on non-
human animals' "otherness" enables the unreasonable glorification of the spiritual 
experience of human predation. Such thinking must be supplanted; where 
Shepard advocates that humans speak thanks for the generative kill, I promote an 
ethics of listening for the perhaps ungrateful but still compelling call of the ani-
mal via unfamiliar idioms. 
Some authors arc already taking tentative steps in this direction. ror example, 
recently published collections in the field of geography also recognize in broad 
terms the types of dichotomies this paper analyzes and thus deserve mention 
here. Philo advocates the explicit political project that takes animals seriously as 
another social group and focuses on their transgressive symbolic power (52-3). 
I ~mcl writes of animals as "symbols of resistance" (112-113). Michel writes of the 
care for wildlife as a political act of resistance (176), and Lynn describes speaking 
for the moral value of animals as "transgressing the boundaries of our human-
centered morality" (286). Philo and Wilbert most closely approach this paper's fo-
cus on the nexus of civility and animality in another collection of geographical 
writings when they speak of constructing a "new animal geography" in which ani-
mals receive our extended "courtesies" (25). 1 n the same volume, Jones empha-
sizes the uneven ethical relationships between humans and other animal species, 
even hesitantly advocating the "adaptation" of Levinasian themes, again ap-
proaching the discussion that will dominate some of the remaining sections of 
this paper, which plumb Levinasian themes more deeply than does Jones's brief 
treatment, while supplementing these themes with the thoughts of Heidegger and 
Derrida. 
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All these thinkers have already stepped into postmodern philosophical terri-
tory by seeking alternative possibilities to present themselves where other animals 
are concerned and by encouraging the construction of "new geographies" like 
Haraway's "cyborg world," in which humans avoid relationships of hierarchical 
domination or "hyperpolarization," reflected in the dichotomies discussed 
throughout this paper, and instead affirm their joint kinship with beings from 
contradictory standpoints (154). These authors already recognize the implications 
of the postmodern condition vis-a-vis the human-non-human animal relationship, 
and their analyses of the dichotomies between modernity and postmodcrnity pro-
vide the transition to a reoriented view of the philosophical history of the human-
animal dichotomy and of the implications for this dichotomy of the new 
environment these writers describe. Deploying transformed ideas from the writ-
ings of Heidegger, Levinas, and Derrida into this debate will add to these concep-
tual anabases, helping to chart a middle course between the sameness oriented 
Great Ape Project and the otherness rooted analysis Shepard provides--a course in 
which civility and animality supplement each other through meaningful contact 
without assimilation. 
Modernist Approaches to Philosophical Ethics 
A discussion of postmodern thinkers docs well to begin by examining the 
views of the modern thinkers whose views they undermine or transcend. In the 
history of human treatment of non-human animals, two trends have dominated, 
each with a source in one of two main Western ethical theories, deontological and 
utilitarian. Paradigmatic exemplars of each camp, Immanuel Kant and Jeremy 
Bentham, explicitly addressed the subject in a way that reflects the dichotomous 
thinking discussed throughout this paper. 
Kant clearly states that non-human animals, as "non-rational," have mere "in-
direct" ethical relevance. Only " rational" human beings can legislate or embody 
the pure moral law and thus qualify as ends-in-themselves, while non-self-con-
scious, non-rational animals can exist only as means to human ends. Of course, 
Kant's banishment of animals from the realm of directly relevant beings docs not 
necessarily imply the acceptability of, nor docs Kant condone, human cruelty to-
ward animals. However, Kant bases his condemnation of animal cruelty on the 
grounds that a human who indulges in animal cruelty will be more likely also to 
cause gratuitous harm to other human beings. Thus, according to Kant, humans 
have an "indirect'' duty "regarding" animals that prohibits wanton cruelty toward 
them, but this is so only because humans have other "direct'' duties towards each 
other as fcUow rational ends-in-themselves (LectNres 239-40). 
This structure has determined the lives of bmions of animals, and though 
Kant did not condone human cruelty toward animals, his intellectual legacy in-
cludes the notorious Cartesian vivisectionists, who argued that non-human ani-
mals were incapable of suffering pain, and thinkers such as Jan Narvcson, who 
while not denying the existence of non-human animal pain, argues that the quality 
and therefore the ethical relevance of the suffering of beings with sophisticated 
mental capacities is different from the suffering of lower animals with less com-
plicated inner lives. While this might seem to bolster a position according to which 
176 
The Animal Other 
mammals should be treated humanely while insects may be killed, Narveson 
draws the dividing line higher up the phylogenic scale, and rather than attempt to 
deny animal pain as Shepard does, he rejects its relevance to human beings (37). 
Such a basically Kantian perspective characterizes prevalent Western attitudes re-
garding human treatment of non-human animals. Laws exist, too, that proscribe 
non-institutionalized animal cruelty, but institutionalized animal cruelty for hu-
man benefit is countenanced--cvcn for minor benefits such as the satisfaction of 
culinary tastes. While people might argue about which animals are ethically edible 
and which experiments arc morally permissible, most people affirm that to satisfy 
hunger or to expand scientific knowledge, considerable animal suffering is al-
lowed, even if regretted. 
Kant's contcmpc>rary and paradigmatic utilitarian Jeremy Bentham advanced a 
view regarding non-human animals that has persistently dogged the Kantian per-
spective. Bentham's utilitarian approach is theoretically simple: ethical decisions 
require that one calculate the interests of all involved and choose the course of 
action that will maximize the benefit among this group. Some standard problems 
with utilitarian thinking arc well known, e.g., the tenuous nature of inter-subjec-
tive value calculations and the ways that strict utilitarianism allows intolerable 
harms to individuals or minorities provided sufficient benefit to the majority 
(f Tarwood 179-192, Mel ntyre 236-243). Another major source of criticism is 
Bentham's unitary notion of pleasure as the sole good. According to Bentham's 
formulation, opponents claimed, one must conclude that given the choice be-
tween "satisfied fool,, and "unsatisfied Socrates," or between "satisfied pig,, and 
"unsatisfied human,,, the former states would be preferable. Indeed, Bentham is 
famous for the following statement regarding non-human animals: "The question 
is not, 'Can they renso11?' nor, 'Can they talk?' but 'Can they S11ffeit"' (307). This 
valuation of non-human animal being fueled critique of Bentham's emphasis on 
pleasure and earned his If edonistic Calculus the moniker of "swine-philosophy." 
It also highlights the major weakness of the last two hundred years of utilitarian 
thought on this topic, from Bentham to Peter Singer: inadequate treatment of the 
differcncc(s) between humans and other animals. 
For example, inadequate consideration of this difference prompts some to 
proclaim the existence of "animal rights." While I support the motivating position 
that people should respect the lives of other animals more than many people cur-
rently do, I believe that the compulsion to advocate animal rights results from a 
failure to consider fully the ontological diffcrcncc(s) between human and animal 
being-from an ethics of the same, which assumes that ethical relationships are 
necessarily and essentially contractual and/or symmetrical. Do dogs have the right 
to vote? As l f eiclegger writes in a different context, "Such judgment may be com-
pared to the procedure of trying to evaluate the essence and powers of a fish by 
seeing how long it can live on dry land" ("I f umanism" 265). 
Kant and Bentham both contribute to the ethical approach this paper will 
chart, but where Bentham underemphasizcs the difference between human and 
animal being, Kant overemphasizes it. In a sense, Kant has the form right and the 
content wrong, while Bentham has the form wrong and the content right. 
Bentham is right to extend direct ethical consideration to non-human animals; he 
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is wrong to believe that the detached, mathematical calculation of interests and 
consequences is equal to the task of ethical thinking or that a concept of non-hu-
man animals' sameness vis-a-vis humanity provides the only necessary buttress for 
an argument that encourages the direct consideration of their interests. Kant is 
wrong to deny non-human animals such direct consideration, but he is right to 
recognize that human rationality and the difference between human and non-hu-
man animal beings are crucial factors in this particular ethical relationship, and he 
is right to seek a transcendent, radical ground for ethics rather than relying solely 
on empirical calculation, which is always tenuous and provisional. The 
postmodern break with the modern ethics of utility or cleontology, fuclecl in part 
by the thoughts of Heidegger, Lcvinas, ancl Dcrricla, proviclcs the basis for a new 
approach to questions regarding the ethical status of non-human animals--one 
that transcends the difficulties involved with both traclitional formulations of the 
1SSUC. 
The Post-Modern Alternative 
This paper presents a possible middle ground between, on one hand, the as-
cendant humanist view, which recognizes only non-human animals' otherness and 
defines them essentially as mere raw material for the satisfaction of human needs 
or desires and, on the other hand, the extreme sort of naturalism that can grow 
from a myopic focus on non-human animals, (or "nature's") sameness, vis-a-vis 
humanity. It attempts to accomplish this by recogni:t.ing the proper contributions 
and limitations of each of these formulation s of non-human animal beings and 
by supplementing them with ideas from an ethics of deconstruction, inspired by 
the writings of Martin l Ieidegger, Emmanuel Levin as, and Jacques Derrida. 
Each member of this trio challenges aspects of the Cartesian foundational ism 
that grounds modernist approaches to ethics such as Kant's Categorical J mpera-
tive and Bentham's Hedonistic Calculus. 'The approaches of Kant and Bentham 
assume that rational deliberations by an objective, isolated, and de-historicized 
subject produce unquestionable ethical guidelines. Poststructuralist thinkers, on 
the other hand, have challenged the unquestionable validity of the rules thus pro-
duced, the discrete and objective self that produced them, and the assumecl 
knowledge regarding those to whom the rules apply. I suggest an alternative for-
mulation that offers the possibility of allowing the non-human animal to present 
its ethical demands before its submission to the rules or methods of calculation to 
which humans normally submit the other and its interests. The traditional ap-
proach assumes that before one can address questions regarding non-human ani-
mals' ethical s tatus, one must first define the essence of animals' beings. Kant and 
Bentham both begin their ethical deliberations regarding animals in this way, and 
their definitions of an animal's essence as either sentient or non-rational risk com-
mitting the sort of ontological imperialism that produces an "ethics of the same" 
(sec the discussion of Levinas's critique below). What 1 am calling for here is an 
acknowledgement from the beginning of ethical deliberation that the other animal 
always outstrips my knowledge, and that the true ethical relationship between 
"civilized" humans and "uncivilized,, non-human animals is indeed founded in 
this radical difference and lack of comprehension. 
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~ile one of my goals is to pr~mote an evolution in consciousness regarding 
the e~hical status of no~-human anunals and the prevention of needless suffering, 
working through these issues surrounding non-human animals' ethical status can 
serve humanity as well, advancing understanding of the nature of inter-human 
ethics .. •or example, one who attempts inter-human application of notions from 
the eth~cs of .clcconstruction, such as "absolute alterity" or "radical hospitality," 
faces clifficulties that do not plague one who applies these concepts to the en-
co~ntcr ?ct:wccn hu.mans and other animals, where structural asymmetry and non-
reciprocity arc obvious and inescapable. Contracts arc impossible in this latter 
cncou~tcr, ?~t they ~re ~ftcn indispensable in human interaction. The economy 
of racl1cal gtving can inspire our goocl will toward fellow humans, but, for reasons 
that If obbes expatiated in the seventeenth century, before full elaboration of ei-
ther the traditional clcontological/utilitarian polarity or the postmodern alterna-
tive, it woulcl be impractical to expect the economy of radical giving to dominate 
our courts, marketplace, international relations, etc. This paper advances ethical 
dialogue by shcclcling new light on the possible contributions and limitations of an 
i~t:r-human ethics grounded in ideas of asymmetry or radical alterity, by rccog-
n1:t.ing the asymmetrical "ethics of deconstruction" (sec the work of Simon 
Critchley for a full exposition of the meaning of this phrase) at work in the hu-
man-animal encounter and by analyzing the relationship between the inter-human 
encounter and that between humans and other animals. 
This work will also hold important significance for the specialized field of en-
vironmental ethics, where the question of non-human animals' ethical status is 
usually treated. Much work in this area has roots in the "land ethic" of thinkers 
such as Ale.lo l ,eopolcl or, more recently, by the "deep ecology" of thinkers such as 
Arne Nacss. While these approaches do represent a conceptual evolvement vis-a-
vis the delimitations of the human-animal relationship that Kant and Bentham in-
spire, their relationship with these latter thinkers is "eschatological" in the same 
sense as arc the thoughts of I Icidegger and Levinas vis-a-vis the deontological 
and utilitarian ethical approaches generally, in that they sometimes seem to advo-
c~te escaping human subjectivity or denying ontological difference between spe-
cies, or between humanity and " nature" in general. This maneuver degrades 
humanity and fails to recogni:t.c important responsibilities entailed by humanity's 
unique position in the ecosphere; it also degrades animality by not recognizing 
something noted by thinkers from Buddha to Bentham to Peter inger and Tom 
Regan: that sentience matters-that, generally speaking, biological creatures ca-
pable of suffering deserve more direct ethical consideration than do inanimate 
and insentient things. This is not to deny the huge indirect or instrumental ethical 
relevance of entities such as plants, soils, bodies of water, or ecosystems, but to 
recognize the bounds of both human and non-human subjectivity, as well as the 
responsib ilities entailed by the special powers humans exercise as they relate to 
other animals and to nature at large. 
Heidegger and Animal Being 
Of the several places in which [ Icidegger analyzes the being of non-human 
animals, the most extensive is a section of The F1111do11Je11tal Co11cepts of Metopl.!Jsics: 
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World, Finit11de Solitlfde, where be describes non-human animal being as "poor-in-
world." While non-human animal being is subjective and not "worldless" like the 
being of the stone, the non-human animal is capable of only a limited range and 
depth of experiential relationships-unlike human Dascin, who is the only being 
constitutionally able to relate to anything "as such." According to I Ieideggcr's de-
scription, non-human animals "have" a world, but they arc "benumbed" or "be-
dazzled" by it and are unable to recognize this or anything else "as such." I le 
contrasts this relative shallowness of non-human animal experience with the rich-
ness of "world-forming" human Dascin. Elsewhere, along similar lines, 
Heidegger discusses the "abyss of essence'' that separates the human who can 
think, speak, and "have hands" (as opposed to mere grasping organs) from the 
ape that cannot ("Thinking"). While I Icidegger denies that his ontological dis-
course regarding non-human animality implies any corresponding ethical determi-
nation, his consideration of the ontological difference between the being of 
humans and that of other animals, like Kant's less extensive reflections, facilitates 
responding to thinkers who inappropriately apply conventional inter-human sys-
tems of contractual, symmetrical, "ethics of the same" to the relationship be-
tween humans and other animals, which is structurally non-contractual, 
asymmetrical, and rooted in ontological difference. 
This emphasis on the ontological difference between humans and other ani-
mals is one part of Heidegger's contribution to my project; a second is his call to 
an essentially phenomenological mode of thinking that docs not immediately as-
sault being with the demands of the ratio but attempts to open a clearing for being 
to emerge "without reason," as he discusses at length in The Pri11dple of &oso11. 
Heidegger also discusses different modes of human being-of Being coming to 
presence through humans in different ways-by writing of thinking as poitJis, 
prior to its co-optation in the service of theoria and tech11e ("1 I umanism" 218-221 ). 
Such a position suggests that humans (and "humanism") fail to recognize such 
possible modes of aletheia when they assume that ratio marks the essence of hu-
manity and depend exclusively on this mode of encountering the world.3 
Heidegger refutes the idea, central to the metanarrative of Kant and Bentham, 
that humanity is exhaustively or essentially defined as the animal rationale, linking 
such a notion with that of humanity as a11i111al llletapf?ysicmn, and arguing that meta-
physics is overcome in the mode of thinking he valorizes. This has ramifications 
for Kantian and utilitarian formulations of ethics in general and for the dominant 
approaches to the question of non-human animals' ethical status in particular that 
Kant and Bentham inspire, for these orientations arc products of the a11imale ratio-
nale-Kant and Bentham both legislate moral law according to Jaws set by the ratio 
of the "animal metaphysic1111/' that Heidegger undermines. 
The animal rationale might be "the lord of beings," but I Jcidegger prefers a 
conception of humanity as "the shepherd of Being I· .. whol gains the essential 
poverty of the shepherd, whose dignity consists in being called by Being itself 
into the preservation of Being's truth" ("J f umanism" 245). Where elsewhere 
Heidegger had defined non-human animals being with the image of "poverty," 
here he speaks of the poverty of human Dascin, who is powerless in the face of 
the call of responsibility entailed by humanity's being thrown into its role as " pre-
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server of Being's truth"-cven though it is humans' particular "powers" that al-
low them to hear this call in the first place. According to I Ieidegger, fundamental 
"Ek-sistencc, [ ... J ecstatic dwelling in the nearness of Being [ ... ] is the guardian-
ship, that is, the care for Being" (246). Heidegger's contribution to my project in-
cludes the exploration of possible modes of existence other than those that 
"assault" or "en frame" being ("Technology" 311-341 )-particularly non-human 
animal modes of being-and the introduction of a concept of stewardship that, 
when applied to the relationship between humans and other animals, acknowl-
edges the importance of ontological differences between humans and other ani-
mals and recognizes the responsibility that this difference entails for those of us 
who m11 relate to things "as such" and who do have hands that "form worlds"-
in~luc.Jing those worlds of which other animal species arc either inhabitants or 
pnsoncrs. 
The implications of all this for questions of animal ethics should be obvious 
by this point, though I Jcidegger docs not explicitly thematize them. rirst, 
If eidegger's approach stands in direct contrast with the " modern" approaches 
represented by and issuing from Kant and Bentham, who assume as given the ex-
istence of the discrete subject as calculator of value and legislator of moral law. 
l nsteac.J, If eidegger c.Jiscusses a more "originary ethics" than any "humanistic" or 
"metaphysical" version, with roots in what he calls a primordial ethos. I Ieidegger 
describes a structure in which ethical demands issue not from the reasoning and 
calculative metaphysical subject but from Being itself, and humanity's task is to re-
spond appropriately. When over-reaching metaphysical tendencies are sufficiently 
checked, the possibility for a new "path of thinking" emerges-a path that pre-
sents itself in stark contrast to the style of calculative thought that demands or 
renders reasons (Pri11dple 26-7) or that "enframcs" everything as "standing re-
serve" for technological utilization ("Technology" 311-341). This new path is 
marked by gelosse11heit- a "rclcasement'' toward things that lets beings be, without 
assaulting them with the subjective assertions of a humanistic metaphysics. 
While humanity's uniquely "ontological" nature gives it partial power to form 
its own world, the products of human reason also largely determine the content 
of any world that non-human animals have. The "guardianship" of which 
1 Icidcgger speaks resonates with an ethics founded in an asymmetrical power 
structure. As the only animal which, according to I Tcideggcr, can have hands and 
form worlds, humanity has the power on one hand to force the animal being to 
render itself as standing reserve in a factory farm (not to mention the power to 
eliminate other animal species altogether), or, on the other hand, to structure the 
world in a manner that includes areas where other animals have freedom to be 
more "authentically."4 If umans can force calves into being the ethically irrelevant 
source of veal, or they can allow them the freedom to move, to nurse, to play, etc. 
The call of responsibility referred to above can be seen as the natural result of 
humanity's unique nature as guardian of Being, and it implies a concept of stew-
ardship regarding non-human animal life which strives to allow certain modes of 
animal being to flourish while not forcing into presence torturous and distorted 
forms of animal being, such as those that exist on veal farms and in laboratories 
for the development of cosmetics. 
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To borrow another expression, this one from the essay on technology: for ani-
mals, indeed, from whence the danger comes, also comes the saving power. I Iu-
mans have perpetually employed their cognitive powers in strategics of 
oppression and violence against other animal species. Some might seek to jettison 
rationality completely, but the strategy outlined here involves employing our cog-
nitive powers to realize that rationality is not the ne pl/IS If/Ira of creation, but, to 
speak as Heidegger, is but one mode among others of the prcsencing of Bcing-
though a particularly dangerous mode in its tendency to shut out other forms. It is 
not a matter of renouncing rationality or technology but of not allowing thetie 
modes of aletheia to obliterate other valuable modes of being, human and animal. 
Similarly, it is not a mater of escaping or relinquishing our role as shepherd, but 
of embodying it with humane respect for other animals over whom we have 
power-of reaffirming the archaic sense of "civility" as gentle, kind, and lm111a11t. 
The major deficit in Heidegger's thought where this project is concerned is 
the absence of any explicit ethical conclusions about the human-animal relation-
ship that his extensive ontological reflections regarding human and animal being 
might be expected to yield, and this study will benefit by supplementing 
Heidegger's contributions with the discourse of Immanuel Lcvinas and Jacques 
Derrida. 
Levinas's Other and the 'Unreasonable' Uniqueness of 
Humanity 
Like H eidegger, Immanuel I.-evinas secs his own work as breaking with the 
dominant Western orientation, but where f fcidcgger marks that tradition as 
bound by Plato and Nietzsche, Lcvinas's landmarks arc Parmcnidcs and 
Heidegger. In fact, Levinas secs Heidegger as the paramount representative of an 
approach that squelches the Other. It docs this, Lcvinas argues, by shutting the 
thinking self off from access to the Other's alterity and thinking of it in such a 
way as to force it into categories of the Same. Lcvinas comments on his relation-
ship with Heidegger in numerous places. In one representative example, he states, 
"Heidegger's Dascin? Dasein never wonders whether, by being da, ' there', it's tak-
ing somebody else's place!" (Frmch Philosophers 19). 
Levinas calls his own project "ethics as first philosophy," in contrast with the 
"ontological" approach that has hitherto dominated Western thought, rejecting 
the self-initiated categorization of the Other (Totaliry 69) and condemning West-
ern philosophy as a process of "ontology [ ... involving! a reduction of the other 
to the same" (Totali!J 43). Like IJeidcggcr, Levinas avoids issuing moral guidelines 
in the traditional sense, because, for Lcvinas, the encounter with altcrity is primary, 
and this altcrity is radically unknowable. This renders unjustifiable attempts to 
subject the Other to any ultimate, rationally derived moral principle such as the 
Categorical Imperative or the Principle of Benefit Maximization. Commentators 
note this aspect of Levinasian ethics as well, e.g., Llcwclyn reviews of Lcvinas's 
idea of the ethical as prior to the ideas of justice that guide dcontological and te-
leological moralities (137), and Davis distinguishes Levinas's project from those 
that employ codes of rules or study reasoning about how we should behave (35). 
The fundamental problem plaguing both dominant approaches to non-human 
animal ethics is that they assume that their firs t step in deciding what obligations 
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humans have toward other animals must be to provide some positive answer to 
th~ question: "What are non-human animals?" Kant and Bentham both proceed 
this way, and both make hasty and one-sided presumptions of knowledge about 
0th.er animals' being in ~rdcr to submit these beings to rules established by ratioci-
natJon. In contrast, Levinas eschews the questions ''Who is the other?" and ''What 
is the other?" and declares that such questions reduce the other to a "character 
within a contc.xt," robbing it.of its inherent elusiveness (Nemo 86). If the concept 
of the Other 1s enlarged to include members of other animal species, then it be-
comes clea: that Bentham's assimilation of non-human animals within the sphere 
of the sentient and Kant's conscription of the "non-rational" animal to the lower 
tier o.f m~re in~ir~ct ethical relevance could both be considered guilty of the "on-
tological imperialism" and suppression of altcrity that Lcvinas means to counter. 
Non-human animali ty's relative powerlessness----cvcn its "poverty in world"-
can, when viewed through this Lcvinasian lens, reinforce the call to stewardship 
developed from I fcidegger's writings. 
. l ,ev'.nas a~so dwells extensively on the structural asymmetry of the ethical rc-
la~1onsh1p; this comes to the fore in his symbolism of the Other as "orphan, 
widow, strnnger"- symbols that emphasize the relative powerlessness of the 
Other (Totality 76-77, among other places). Levinas illuminates a structure in 
';hich ~he forcefulness of the Other's demand for respect varies in inverse propor-
aon with the Other's level of "power'' in the usual sense of the word. The mar-
ginal figures of the widow, orphan, and stranger arc all somehow deprived (of a 
husband, of parents, or of friendly fellows); they lack the power to command 
~thical respect by physical force or via a symmetrical contract, but they command 
it nonetheless-and for this reason (Othenvise 11, de G reef 507-520). Lcvinas's 
Other, paradoxically, occupies a position of power relative to the self and calls the 
freedom of the self into question (Totali!J 84). Once this necessary structural 
asymmetry of the ethical relationship that Lcvinas illustrates is acknowledged, it 
becomes clear that the distinctions between humanity and animality, upon which 
both Kant and r Icidcgger insist, need not be denied or transcended- but neither 
need they entail excluding non-human animals from the realm of direct ethical 
relevance. 1 nstead, these distinctions can become the source for the explicit and 
radical inclusion of non-human animals in the ethical inner circle, as humans are 
led to extend human "civility" to the non-human animal world. 
One other Lcvinasian theme deserving attention is that of "the face," which 
proves extraordinarily fruitful in explaining both the connections between hu-
mans and other animals and the difference between all animals (humans included) 
and "things." T his image, crucial for Lcvinas, is perhaps even more important for 
the project of this paper. 1 ,ikc.: language between humans- the privileged medium 
for ethical discourse, strongly venerated by Lcvinas-thc biological face is not 
necessarily a requirement for ethical obligation, but it is usually a sufficient mark 
of it, possessed by humanity and by most non-human animals, though absent in 
plants or most "mere.: things." The face is a window through which contact and 
exchange of meaning (though perhaps never stable and controllable exchange) 
can occur; it indicates the possibility of relationship with another subjective being. 
Jllustrative of this, humans inscribe faces on inanimate objects to facilitate meta-
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phorical or pseudo-subjective relationships with them. The protagonist in a recent 
major Hollywood film paints a bloody face o n a volleyball , thereby transforming it 
from lifeless " object" into beloved co mpanio n, whose loss the castaway earnestly 
grieves. The application of the pseudo-face enables this metaphorical subjective 
relationship, facilitating o ne's "suspensio n of disbelief," because the natural face 
usually marks a site o f subjective expression and meaningful exchange. 
While Lcvinas's ethical philosophy supplements the dearth o f direct ethical 
statements in H eidegger, it is itself limited and in need of supplementation. 
Abundant critics declare that Levinas's characterizations pretermit direct, "first-
tier" relationships with potential O thers-the feminine Other is the most widely 
cited example (see, e.g., the wo rk o f Critchley, Chanter , Gottlieb, Gould, Katz, 
Manning, and McDonald). More relevant to the project o f this paper, Derrida 
("Violence"), Benso, and others have leveled the specific charge of humanism 
against Lcvinas, and indeed, mimicking Kant's explicit exclusionary gesture, 
Levinas clearly denies that it is appropriate to apply his "ethics of alte ri ty" directly 
to non-human animals. When questioned poin tedly about the ethical status of 
no n-human animals in an interview, included in the compilation Re-Readi11g Ltui11ru 
under the title, "The Paradox o f Morality," Levinas resists the idea that animals 
have an "ethical face," arguing that in contrast to his conceptuali:mtio n C>f the 
ethical phenomenon of the human face, the animal face is merely " biological"- it 
docs not invite or co mmand a direct ethical respo nse as the face of the other hu-
man docs. In Totality a11d I11ji11ity, Levinas describes the primary ethical relatio nship 
as that of " man-to-man" (79), and elsewhere he locates the genesis of his thought 
in the "strange relation to other h11111011I' (Co11uersolio11s 57-58). Like Kant, Levinas 
condemns animal cruelty, but the firm line between other humans as directly ethi-
cally relevant and other animals as not directly ethically relevant remains. J\ lso like 
K ant, Lcvinas grounds this distinction in the concept of reason, though he 
switches the terms, arguing that primary ethics entails solely in ter-human rela-
tions, because humans arc the uniquely "1111reasonable" creatures capable of ethi-
cal tho ught, which is eminently " irrational," according to Levinas, because o f the 
paradoxical power structure described above. Lcvinas's exclusio n of the eminently 
" reasonable" non-human animal who lives according to natu ral law from the first 
tier of ethical relevance, occupied exclusively by " unreasonable" humanity, de fies 
his more fundamental reverence for otherness and his affi rmation of an asym-
metrical ethical relationship. Challenging the sufficiency and/ or necessity of simi-
larity and symmetry in the ethical relatio nship, as Levinas vehemently urges, 
requires re-thinking the uncivil exclusion of no n-human animals from the sphere 
of the directly ethically relevant, irrespective o f quality or quantity o f reason. 
Lcvinas' laudable insistence on the ethical importance o f o ther humans leads to 
his unfortunate assertion that it is 011/y humani ty to which his admonitio ns fully 
pertain. This " humanism" requires supplementation by the anti-humanistic ideas 
of I Jeidcgger, discussed above, while Levinas's tendency to privilege human lan-
guage as the ultimate medium of direct ethical discourse will benefit from ideas 
bound up with Derrida's concept of "deconstruction," discussed below.s 
Bentham's assimilation of animals within the sphere o f the lmerelyl sentient, 
Kant's conscription of the animal to the non-rational and only indirectly ethically 
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relevant realm, f Tcidcggcr's approbation of human Dasein's language as the ulti-
mate house of being, and Levinas's privileging o f the human face, could all be 
considered guil ty of an ontological imperialism that suppresses non-human ani-
~al alteri ty. ~go~ of this paper is to challenge the prevailing dichotomies regard-
ing the relat1onsh1p between "civil" humanity and the "animal" world, and a great 
deal of what Levinas writes is clearly useful in such a project. Prior to certain gen-
eral determinations about animals as sentient like humans or, unlike humans, as 
no n-rational, non-linguistic, or non-handed, there is the presence of the animal's 
individual subjectivity, which is fo rever essentially unknowable, yet still accessible 
to some degree through non-linguistic phenomenological channels. With many 
fo rms of animal being we arc presented with precisely the type o f radical alterity 
Levinas describes: manifestly present, yet at least partially inherently inaccessible 
to any rational operation one might take. The asymmetrical structure of the rela-
tionship l ,evinas stresses is obviously in place in the human-nonhuman animal en-
counter. T hough Lcvinas docs not acknowledge such direct connections, potent 
seeds for a rethinking of animal ethics (and animal ontology) lie scattered 
throughout his writings. Once the necessary structural asymmetry of the ethical 
relationship that Levinas illustrates is recognized, it becomes clear that the distinc-
tions between humanity and animality upon which Kant, I Ieideggcr, and Levinas 
insist, while not denied, no longer serve as reason to exclude no n-human animals 
from the realm of direct ethical relevance. Rather, they become the source for 
their explicit and radical inclusion. T his approach allows the immediate recogni-
tion of ethical demands placed on us by the paradigmatic manifestations of the 
alterity that J ,evinas's admittedly "humanistic" project helps one to rccognize-
mani fcstations that arc embodied in non-human animal forms, which are power-
less in their subjection to the worlds, if any, that human civilization forms for 
them and allows them to have. 
Civility and Animality in Derrida and Beyond 
To this point, we have J Teidegger contributing a phenomenological way of 
thinking beyond the limitations of modern metaphysical humanism and laying the 
groundwork for a concept of stewardship that f Ieidcgger does no t elaborate but 
that is crucial to the project of this paper, while Levinas provides the insistence on 
the primacy of ethics and the relationship with the other person, though his con-
tribu tion is limited because for Lcvinas it is 011/y other human beings who qualify 
for fi rst-tier consideration. Benso sketches a chiasmus of H eidegger and Lcvinas 
in th is way, describing an "ethics of things" that extends to inanimate objects the 
same direct consideration usually reserved for other humans. H erc I introduce the 
wo rk of D errida to endorse, contrary to Benso (and some "deep ecologis ts"), re-
taining the distinction between direct and indirect duties but shifting it from the 
boundary between human and non-human to the boundary between the animal 
and the inanimate. Toward this end, D er rida's work helps to establish a link be-
tween the anti-humanistic tendencies o f Heidegger and the insistence on the pri-
macy of ethics as the asymmetrical encounter with altcrity that Levinas provides, 
while avoiding both Heidegger's alleged ethical obscurity and Levinas's explicit 
humanism. D errida's ideas supplement those o f fleidegger and Lcvinas, support-
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ing or extending root assumptions of both thinkers' projects while indicating 
places where their discourses arc vulnerable to their own critiques. 
For Derrida, the ideas of I Jcidcggcr and Lcvinas arc cschatological in their at-
tempts to make contact with absolute alterity or to transcend, via language, a hu-
manistic horizon. Derrida questions any claim to transcend a humanistic or 
anthropocentric frame of mind, arguing that reliance on language "ceaselessly re-
instates the new terrain on the oldest ground," re-establishing one "more naively 
and more strictly than ever" inside the realm one purports to transcend (Margi11s 
135). Derrida insists that a critique of "humanism" and "metaphysics" such as 
that issued by I Tcidegger can only come from within that very tradition and using 
tools it provides (Bennington 303-309). 
Derrida treats 1 ,evinas's approach similarly in "Violence and Metaphysics," 
which is both a defense of I Jc id egger in the face of Lcvinas's attacks and a cri-
tique of Levinas's formulation of absolute altcrity. For Derrida, description of an 
encounter with truly absolute alterity is a practical impossibility, for one cannot 
describe that which one can by definition have no comprehension-there must be 
some similarity for a self to recognize an other as existing at all (Bernasconi 128-
131). As with his critique of f feidcgger, Derrida's point is that Lcvinas's descrip-
tion of absolute alterity requires that he employ the ontological language that he 
seeks to transcend, and thus that any contact with the other must involve some 
mutual affectedness (ll'/riti11g 151). This points toward the middle ground between 
the various dichotomies discussed in this paper. 
Derrida's writings on ethics display both his distance from the strands of 
thought Kant and Bentham represent and his proximity to l Icideggcr and 
Lcvinas. But unlike his postmodern peers, Derrida speaks more directly to ques-
tions regarding the ethical relationship between humans and other animals, find-
ing problematically " humanistic" clements within both I leidegger who eschewed 
humanism, and Levinas, who built a philosophy around the concept. Derrida 
questions the metaphysical presuppositions behind 1 lcideggcr's treatment of the 
ape in lrhat is Co/ltd Thi11ki11g?, applying his dcconstructive method to I Tcidcgger's 
absolute opposition between human and non-human animals, which, like every 
opposition (according to Derrida), "effaces I· . ·I differences and leads back l· . . ) to 
the homogenous" ("Geschlecht Tl" 174). 
Derrida issues the same sort of critique against Levinas, arguing that Levinas 
founds his ethics upon a notion of discourse as human language such that only 
the one species capable of speech is considered directly ethically relevant 
(Critchley 177-182). Derrida also discusses the tendency of the community to 
band together while excluding the other (Caputo 64), and this critique is easily ap-
pJjed to Lcvinas's humanism, which was perhaps necessary in the post-Auschwitz 
context and is admirable for its attention to and respect for human altcrity, but 
which nonetheless falls short of a respect for the fu ll range of alterity's possible 
embodiments by excluding non-human animals from the ethical inner circle and 
failing to acknowledge animali ty's non-reciprocal appeal for human civility. 
To round out Derrida's contribution, three themes in his later writings pro-
vide the final key to the vision of the human-non-human animal relationship that 
this paper promotes: friendship, justice, and the gift. Derrida writes of "a friend-
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ship. :'ithout presen~e,. without resemblance, without affinity, without analogy" 
(Pohtus 154-155). This 1dea of friendship that he describes is in some ways more 
appropriately applicable to the relationship between humans and non-human ani-
mals than it is to the inter-human encounter, for the non-human animal friend 
lacks the resemblances, affinities, and analogies (shared verbal/linguistic capaci-
ties, rationality, etc.) that are at least latent in inter-human discourse. This is linked 
with Derrida's supplementation of the traditional contractual notion of justice-
deontological or utilitarian-with an "infinite idea of justice, infinite because irre-
ducible, [ . ... ] before any contract [ .... ]" ("Force" 965). As Kearney writes, this 
means "justice is the idea of a gift without exchange, of a relation to the other 
that is utterly irreducible to the normal rules of circulation, gratitude, recognition, 
or symmetry" (18-50). 
While Derrida's work is important for inter-human ethics as a supplement to 
different versions of contractual ethics such as those elaborated in works &om 
Kant's Gro1111d111ork lo tht 1'1etapf?ysic of Morals to John Rawls's A Theory of ]11stice, the 
non-contractual ethical encounter he describes is even more obviously apparent in 
the human-animal relationship, in which the Other is i11capable of ever reciprocat-
ing in the usual sense. Similarly, in 'Y\t this very moment in this work here I am," 
Derrida explores an idea of "radical ingratitude," arguing that the perseverance of 
the true ethical relationship requires that the recipient of the "gift" not show grati-
tude, for to do so would nullify the Other's transcendence and return the gift to 
the mundane economy of the same. Even more than most human others, with 
whom soflle kind of contract is usually possible--even if it is only the simple ex-
change of help for thanks-non-human animals lack the power of language as we 
know it and are therefore incapable of expressing gratitude in familiar ways. To 
extend the courtesies of civility to them requires acknowledgement of the asym-
metrical structure connecting the community of human civilization with its non-
human animal others. 
The Future Engagement of Civility and Animality in The 
Postmodern Condition 
The implications of all this for our relationship with non-human animals and 
for ethical humanism from Kant to Levinas, seem obvious. It is not necessary to 
escape human subjectivity in order to recognize direct ethical relationships be-
tween humans and other animals. Also, one can acknowledge the vast powers that 
only human animals enjoy without thereby establishing a two-tiered ethical view in 
which beings capable of rational reflection or verbal/linguistic signification are 
valued directly, while beings that inhabit different U111welts and are immersed in 
bioscmiotics arc bestowed only instrumental ethical relevance. Rather, the onto-
logical djfferencc, including the fact that we posses cognitive abilities far beyond 
animal capacity (and therefore powers for good or evil beyond any animal's capac-
ity)-employed by Kant as the grounds for excluding animals from the realm of 
the directly ethically relevant noted but discarded as ethically irrelevant by 
Bentham painstakingly elucidated by Heidegger and maintained in Kantian fash-
ion by Levinas- becomes the basis for the most direct ethical consideration of 
these animal others. The asymmetry of tl1e relationship can be recognized as the 
wellspring of our obligation toward them. 
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H owever, even in Derrida's writings, the relationship between humans and 
o ther animals is usually employed as an example to illustrate a general principle 
but is not investigated thoroughly as a subject replete with its own unique ques-
tions. While in numerous places Derrida uses the conceptual division between hu-
man and animal to exemplify precisely the type of ontological distinction that 
deconstruction deconstructs, discourse regarding the practical treatment of non-
human animals is rare in Derrida's corpus. When it comes to specific and concrete 
questions about the ethical status of non-human animals, even Derrida's thought 
risks falling into "anthropologocentrism." During a conference during the sum-
mer of 1993 Derrida is said to have remarked, "I am a vegetarian in my soul" 
' 
(Steeves 32). O ne wonders, given this formulation, whether Derrida intends to 
distinguish between "vegetarian in soul" (i.e., thinking deconstruction) and "veg-
etarian in body" (specifically "applying" deconstruction), and whether one can be 
the former but not the latter without fall ing short of the ethical demands that 
deconstruction makes. If Derrida docs intend such a distinction, it is unclear how 
this harmonizes with his usual method of dcconstructing such dichotomiett 
Regardless of whether or no t Derrida cats factory-fa rmed chicken, one can, 
by transforming and extend ing lines of thought that he, r Tcidcgger, and Levinas 
establish, advance a radical approach to questions regarding animals' ethical status 
along the lines of the "radical hermeneutics" advocated by Caputo, which "con-
sists not in finding meaning but in dealing with the breakdown of meaning, the 
shattering and fou ndering of meaning' (279). The human-animal relationship 
well exemplifies the eth ical structure that postmodcrnism identifies, but the prac-
tical demands that this relationship entails have yet to be fu lly recognized, and fur-
ther analysis o f postmodern ethical themes and their application to the 
human-animal relationship is eminently timely. Such re-th inking can facilitate ex-
panding the community of beings deser ving civili ty to include even those non-
human animal beings among who m, one might argue, incivil ity reigns. This paper 
is but one tiny part of the vast effort to help "civilization" evolve by reaching back 
towards a near-obsolete sense of "civility" that involves connotations of kindness, 
gentleness, and h111na11eness. It looks forward to days when humans will more per-
vasively apply the values wrapped up in this archaic sense of civility in their inter-
action with the o ther animals whose worlds they shape. 
Notes 
1. The Oxford E nglish Dictionary lists twenty senses, many with subdivisions, of the 
word "civil." Most indicate relatio ns between members of the citizenry, or com-
munity, and deal exclusively with human discourses on society, poli tics, and 
"civil" e thics, with connotations o f citizenship and urbanencss. This paper 
looks to the eleventh definition on the list-a definition marked as obsolete by 
the dictionary's editors-as the key to appropriately understanding the ethical 
h . I h f " . il" " I relationship between humans and ot er amma s: t c sense o ctv as rn-
mane, gentle, kind" (255). 
2. For a contrary view, in which non-human bu t non-do mesticated animal li fe in 
urban centers is the focus, sec the work o f r fuw G riffi ths, Ingrid Poul ter, an<l 
D avid Sibley (56-71) and Jenni fe r Wolch, Alec Brownlow, and Unna Lassiter 
(71-98). 
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3. Alelheia is a Greek term, which Heidegger renders into German as 
"Entbergen," and which EngLish translators have rendered as "revealing" or 
"unconccalment." 
4. I borrow a notion from Being a11d Time here, which is, admittedly, an exposition 
of specifically human being. As with my treatment of Levinas, I would argue 
that this notion of I Ieideggec>s has applicability beyond the realm in which the 
author originally inscribed it. 
5. This assumption of the ethical primacy of human verbal language as the first 
and best link between the self and the other, without acknowledgement that dif-
ferent links might exist between other beings, pervades two of his major works, 
Tolaliry and !Jifi11iry and Othenvise Ihm Being. Bringing ideas from the field of 
"biosemiorics" into the discussion would facilitate the notion of communica-
tion beyond the human verbal and linguistic forms-see e.g., Jacob von 
Uexkull's notion of the Um111elt, which helps one understand animal being in 
ways commensurate with but not identical to human being. 
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